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DISLOYAL AGENTS 
Deborah A. DeMott* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This Article examines the nature and consequences of fiduciary duties 
of loyalty within the context of common law agency. My central claim is 
that duties of loyalty have distinctive functions and consequences, ones dis-
tinct from duties and consequences defined by other bodies of law. Within 
common law agency, an agent owes the principal fiduciary duties of loyalty 
as well as duties of performance. Although an agent owes both types of 
duties, distinctive legal consequences follow a breach of a duty of loyalty. 
These include but are not limited to an enhanced range of remedies avail-
able to the principal. The distinctive consequences triggered by an agent’s 
breach of a duty of loyalty are a helpful vantage point from which to assess 
whether and how an agent’s fiduciary duties of loyalty are themselves dis-
tinct from duties defined by other bodies of law—in particular, contract law 
and tort law principles. I argue that an agent’s fiduciary duties of loyalty 
serve functions related to but distinct from the agent’s duties of performance 
and that these functions, in turn, assist in identifying how best to resolve 
questions about the consequences that should follow an agent’s breach of a 
duty of loyalty. These questions are prominent in recent cases from the 
United States and England.  
It is helpful to begin with a brief discussion of how the common law de-
fines “agency,” in part because its definition is somewhat at odds with defi-
nitions used in contemporary social science and philosophy. Common law 
agency, significant in itself, also furnishes an inescapable backdrop for 
statutory interpretation and for the specification of agents’ duties within 
complex regulatory structures, points beyond the scope of this Article.1 The 
Article then develops a typology of an agent’s duties of loyalty as distinct 
from duties of performance, using a range of contemporary and historical 
  
 
* David F. Cavers Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. I served as the Reporter for 
the Restatement (Third) of Agency. Statements made in this Article represent my own views and do not 
necessarily represent the position of the American Law Institute. I presented this Article in the Meador 
Lecture Series on Fiduciaries at The University of Alabama School of Law in November, 2006. I am 
grateful for comments received on an earlier draft at the Eugene P. and Delia S. Murphy Conference on 
Corporate Law, Fordham University School of Law, November 2005. 
 1. For discussion, see Deborah A. DeMott, Statutory Ingredients in Common Law Change: Issues 
in the Development of Agency Doctrine, in COMMERCIAL LAW AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICE 57, 57-83 
(Sarah Worthington ed., 2003), and RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY, introduction at 6-10 (2006). 
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examples of forms of disloyalty. The Article turns next to the consequences 
of an agent’s breach of a duty of loyalty, which are more complex than may 
initially appear to be the case. Additionally, the consequences of an agent’s 
disloyalty include those that follow when an agent itself is an organization 
in which individual employees commit fiduciary transgressions in the 
course of their work for the organization.  
Legal theorists differ on how best to characterize fiduciary duty; to 
some, it’s best understood as a consequence of contract—as a set of default 
terms to which parties would agree, had they the benefit of unlimited re-
sources. An implied—but not much analyzed—consequence of this view is 
that contract law does or should determine the consequences of breach of 
fiduciary duty.2 However, this implication is not borne out by cases that 
assign consequences to agents’ breaches of the fiduciary duty of loyalty. In 
several respects, their outcomes are inconsistent with what one would pre-
dict were contract law, as applicable in other contexts, to govern. Moreover, 
cases that assign consequences to breaches of the fiduciary duty of loyalty 
are not entirely captured by tort law concepts and standards. A more com-
plex doctrinal and normative vocabulary is required.  
In many ways, the law both reflects and reinforces the widely shared 
belief that betrayal by one subject to a duty to act loyally represents more 
than the disappointment that follows any legally cognizable harm or breach 
of duty, including those stemming from duties defined by contract and tort 
law.3 The relatively ferocious consequences that the law ascribes to an in-
stance of disloyalty by an agent to which the principal has not consented 
reflect the distinctive legal consequences triggered by disloyalty. 
II. COMMON LAW AGENCY AND AGENTS’ DUTIES 
A. Agency Defined  
The common law defines agency as the “fiduciary relationship that 
arises when one person (a ‘principal’) manifests assent to another person (an 
‘agent’) that the agent shall act on the principal’s behalf and subject to the 
principal’s control, and the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so 
to act.”4 The term “agent” is used more broadly in economics literature to 
mean any relationship in which one person engages another to perform a 
  
 2. A recent characterization of this view is that “[a] large body of literature contends that fiduciary 
duties are barnacles on the ship of contract, default contractual terms to which the parties would agree if 
they had the benefit of unlimited resources.” Arthur B. Laby, Resolving Conflicts of Duty in Fiduciary 
Relationships, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 75, 76 (2004). To be sure, one might proceed on the assumption that 
proponents of the “contractualist” view of fiduciary duty may also use “contract” in a non-legal, unex-
amined, or nontechnical sense. For present purposes, more analytic traction follows if we assume that 
accepting a contractualist account of fiduciary duty would also trigger the remedial and other conse-
quences of contract law as generally understood by lawyers. 
 3. For further elaboration, see Deborah A. DeMott, Breach of Fiduciary Duty: On Justifiable 
Expectations of Loyalty and Their Consequences, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 925 (2006). 
 4. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006). 
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service under circumstances that involve delegating some discretion over 
decision-making to the service-performer.5 This includes actors who would 
not be agents under the common law definition, for example, garage me-
chanics and architects. The common law definition, in contrast, means by 
“on behalf of” that an agent acts with power to affect the principal’s legal 
relations by creating rights or obligations applicable to the principal or by 
acquiring knowledge of facts with which the principal is charged. The cen-
tral idea is that an agent serves a representative function and does not sim-
ply provide a service. Thus, agents for purposes of common law agency 
include lawyers, real estate brokers, stock brokers, officers of legal entities 
of all sorts, and employees. The vocabulary of “agency” within contempo-
rary philosophy and literary studies reflects other concerns, in particular the 
capacity of an actor to assert control over the actor’s own intentions, de-
sires, and decisions.6 The point is determining or characterizing an actor’s 
autonomy, as opposed to the consequences of an actor’s relationships with 
others. These are not necessarily inconsistent, though; contemporary ac-
counts of common law agency address the significance of the agent status as 
a distinct person and do not rest on simple identification of an agent with 
the principal.7  
A defining characteristic of relationships that are ones of agency under 
the common law is the principal’s power to give interim instructions to the 
agent although principal and agent have previously agreed the principal will 
not give such instructions, and although, in giving them, the principal 
breaches a contract with the agent. This power is a crucial aspect of the 
principal’s position of control over the agent, itself necessitated by the 
agent’s power to subject the principal to liability to third parties.8 Thus, 
within U.S. corporate law, a corporation’s shareholders do not have a rela-
tionship of common law agency with the corporation’s directors. To be sure, 
directors owe fiduciary duties to the corporation and its shareholders, but 
  
 5. The classic definition as stated in Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the 
Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976): 
“We define an agency relationship as a contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) 
engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating 
some decision making authority to the agent.” 
 6. On usage within contemporary philosophy, see 1 CHARLES TAYLOR, HUMAN AGENCY AND 
LANGUAGE: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 98-99 (1985), stating, “What is crucial about agents is that things 
matter to them. We thus cannot simply identify agents by a performance criterion . . . [t]o say things 
matter to agents is to say that we can attribute purposes, desires, aversions to them in a strong, original 
sense.” 
 7. Earlier accounts of common law agency, in contrast, relied heavily on identifying the agent with 
the principal. The leading example is OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 180-83 
(1923). 
 8. A principal’s power to structure its own organization and to define how work should be done 
within the organization enables the principal to create an identification between the organization and 
those who work on its behalf that may supplement monetary compensation as an inventive device. See 
George A. Akerlof & Rachel E. Kranton, Identity and the Economics of Organizations, 19 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 9 (2005). Akerlof and Kranton suggest that “the legal concept of a fiduciary” can be represented 
“by modeling an employee’s attachment to a firm and motivations to act in the firm’s interest” but leave 
the specifics for further development. Id. at 28. 
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directors, once elected, hold powers of management that are not delegated 
powers comparable to a common law agent’s authority. Likewise, although 
a trustee unquestionably owes fiduciary duties to the beneficiaries of a trust, 
the trustee is not subject to the control of either the beneficiaries or the 
settlor, except as provided in the terms of trust.9  
B. Agents’ Duties  
It’s conventional to distinguish among an agent’s duties. Restatement 
(Third) of Agency uses the terminology of duties of performance10 and du-
ties of loyalty. An agent’s duties of performance include the duty to act only 
as authorized by the principal;11 to fulfill any obligations to the principal 
defined by contract;12 to act with the competence, care, and diligence nor-
mally exercised by agents in similar circumstances;13 and to use reasonable 
effort to provide the principal with facts material to the agent’s duties to the 
principal.14 An agent’s duties of performance are often defined by agree-
ment between principal and agent.  
An agent’s duties of loyalty stem from the agent’s basic obligation to 
act loyally for the principal’s benefit in matters connected with the agency 
relationship.15 An agent’s more specific duties of loyalty include a duty not 
to acquire a material benefit from a third party in connection with transac-
tions or other actions taken on behalf of the principal or otherwise through 
the agent’s use of position;16 a duty not to deal with the principal as or on 
behalf of an adverse party;17 a duty not to compete with the principal or 
assist the principal’s competitors during the duration of the agency relation-
ship;18 and a duty not to use property of the principal, and not to use or 
communicate confidential information of the principal, for the agent’s own 
purposes or those of a third party.19 A principal may consent to conduct by 
the agent that would otherwise breach a duty of loyalty, but in obtaining the 
principal’s consent, the agent must act in good faith and fully disclose mate-
rial information to the principal. Although open-ended advance consents to 
disloyal conduct are not effective,20 the fact that a principal may consent to 
conduct that would otherwise breach an agent’s duties of loyalty mitigates 
the stringency associated with the fiduciary regime of remedies and other 
  
 9. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 5 cmt. e (2003). 
 10. In Restatement (Second) of Agency, these were termed “duties of service and obedience.” 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, ch. 13, tit. B (1958). The term “duties of performance” is used in 
FRANCIS M.B. REYNOLDS, BOWSTEAD AND REYNOLDS ON AGENCY, ch. 6, § 1 (17th ed. 2001). 
 11. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.09 (2006). 
 12. Id. § 8.07. 
 13. Id. § 8.08. 
 14. Id. § 8.11. 
 15. Id. § 8.01. 
 16. Id. § 8.02. 
 17. Id. § 8.03. 
 18. Id. § 8.04. 
 19. Id. § 8.05. 
 20. Id. § 8.06. 
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consequences that follow breach, as does the agent’s power to terminate the 
relationship. 
C. A Typology of Disloyalty 
In assessing an agent’s duties of loyalty more broadly, it’s helpful to 
identify the forms that disloyal action ordinarily assumes and then assess 
what remains. Most typically, an agent’s disloyal action stems either from 
(1) a conflict between the principal’s interests and the agent’s pursuit of the 
agent’s own interests or (2) a conflict between or among the interests of 
multiple principals represented by the same agent. Consider first a classic 
illustration of a conflict between an agent’s pursuit of self-interest in con-
flict with the interest of the agent’s principal, taken from the recently pub-
lished memoir of Warren A. Seavey, the Reporter for Restatement (Second) 
of Agency. Seeking a larger house in 1926 in Lincoln, Nebraska, for his 
growing family, Professor Seavey identified a suitable property and “made 
an offer to the real estate man handling the deal.”21 However, “unknown to 
us,” (the Seaveys) his offered price exceeded by $500 the owner’s reserva-
tion price, that is, the minimum price that the owner told her agent would be 
acceptable to her.22 The agent accepted Professor Seavey’s offer and his 
payment and then, “[w]ith the ethics of the usual real estate dealer,” pock-
eted the $500 difference between the price Seavey paid and the seller’s res-
ervation price.23  
However the agency relationships among the three parties may have 
been structured, the agent’s conduct was disloyal. If the “real estate man” 
served solely as the seller’s agent—the conventional structure in residential 
real estate transactions—the agent’s self-interested retention of the $500 
conflicts with the seller’s interest in receiving all proceeds (net of the 
agent’s commission) from the sale of her property. The agent’s self-interest 
in retaining the $500 also conflicts with the agent’s duty to disclose to the 
seller the material fact that the purchaser offered to pay more than her reser-
vation price for the property. If the “real estate man” represented both buyer 
and seller, even assuming effective consent by both to dual representation 
despite the evident conflict between their interests, the agent disserved both 
buyer and seller by retaining money the buyer wished to pay to the seller. 
And if the “real estate man” represented only Professor Seavey as a buyer’s 
  
 21. WARREN A. SEAVEY & DONALD B. KING, A HARVARD LAW SCHOOL PROFESSOR: WARREN A. 
SEAVEY’S LIFE AND THE WORLD OF LEGAL EDUCATION 58 (2005). At the time, Professor Seavey served 
as Dean of the law school at the University of Nebraska. See id. at 53. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. Professor Seavey reports: “Later, he was chagrined when I charged him with it and was 
angered when I told him he had forfeited his commission and owed $500 to [seller] and $500 to me. He 
was willing to settle for $500 for both and out of consideration for his family I didn’t sue, as that would 
have ruined him.” Id. It is not evident on this account on what basis the agent would be subject to liabil-
ity to both seller and buyer. Perhaps the agent misrepresented the seller’s reservation price to the buyer, 
or the agent represented both parties to the transaction. In any event, the agent’s reaction implies that his 
conduct was inconsistent with local norms. 
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agent, he appears to have withheld material information to facilitate his re-
tention of the $500. Indeed, as this initial example illustrates, disloyalty 
often motivates or at least accompanies compromised performance in other 
respects, as the “real estate man” withheld material information from the 
parties to the transaction.  
Moreover, an agent may act disloyally to the interests of one principal 
by representing another principal whose interests conflict, even when the 
agent does not additionally pursue an individual interest in conflict with the 
principals’ interests. In a recent case from the House of Lords, Hilton v. 
Barker Booth & Eastwood, a firm of solicitors represented both a property 
developer and the firm’s long-standing client, the prospective purchaser of a 
site owned by the developer.24 The firm represented both in the developer’s 
sale of the site but did not inform the developer that it had advanced to the 
purchaser the entire amount of the deposit on the purchase price. Nor did 
the firm inform the developer that the purchaser had only recently been re-
leased from prison following his previous conviction for fraud, which per-
haps explained the practical necessity that his solicitors lend him the amount 
of the deposit!25  
As the Lords acknowledged, had the firm of solicitors disclosed the 
purchaser’s criminal record to the seller, it would have jeopardized the 
firm’s own interest in recovering the amount of the deposit the firm lent to 
the purchaser. Moreover, and distinct from its self-interest in recovering the 
amount lent to the purchaser, the firm assumed irreconcilable duties to both 
its long-term client, the purchaser, and its new client, the developer; “[t]he 
solicitor’s duty of single-minded loyalty to his client very frequently makes 
it professionally improper and a breach of his duty to act for two clients 
with conflicting interests in the transaction in hand.”26 To fulfill its duty of 
disclosure to the developer as seller would require action by the firm—
disclosure of “discreditable facts” about the purchaser—that would breach 
the firm’s duty of loyalty to him.27  
Most instances of disloyal action by agents can be subsumed into these 
two basic categories of action clouded either by a conflicting interest on the 
part of the agent or by conflicting interests among multiple principals.28 
However, not all instances of disloyalty are obviously captured by these two 
categories. For example, an agent may breach the agent’s duty of loyalty by 
obtaining a material benefit in connection with a transaction undertaken on 
behalf of the principal or otherwise through the agent’s use of position. Al-
  
 24. [2005] UKHL 8, 1 W.L.R. 567, 567 (Eng.). 
 25. The firm had represented the purchaser in the prior criminal fraud proceedings against him. Id. 
at 572. 
 26. Id. at 576. 
 27. Id. at 577. Although the fact of the purchaser’s criminal conviction was a matter of public re-
cord, and thus did not constitute confidential information about a client, disclosing the fact to the seller 
would breach the firm’s duty to the purchaser. See id. 
 28. See Matthew Conaglen, The Nature and Function of Fiduciary Loyalty, 121 L.Q.R. 452, 465 
(2005). 
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though such action by the agent could be characterized as stemming from a 
conflict between the agent’s interests and those of the principal, the conflict 
may be much less salient than those discussed above. Thus, had the “real 
estate man” through whom Professor Seavey bought his house represented 
only him, the agent’s retention of the $500 in excess of the seller’s reserva-
tion price is not obviously in conflict with Professor Seavey’s manifest wish 
to acquire the seller’s house at the price he wished to pay. However, had the 
agent fulfilled the agent’s duty to disclose the material fact known to the 
agent—the amount of the seller’s reservation price—one’s hunch is that 
Professor Seavey may have offered less. The conflict is between the agent’s 
self-interest and the agent’s duty to disclose material facts to the principal.  
Moreover, an agent’s receipt of material benefit may breach the agent’s 
duty of loyalty even when the agent’s financial interests appear aligned with 
those of the principal. Consider in this light an Illustration from Restatement 
(Third) of Agency: 
P, who owns a racehorse, Grace, engages A, a jockey, to ride Grace 
in an upcoming race. P agrees to pay A a fee of $500. T, who has 
made a large bet that Grace will win the race, promises to pay A 
$5000 if Grace wins the race. . . . Neither A nor T tells P about T’s 
promise. Grace, ridden by A, wins the race. T pays A $5000.29  
A’s receipt of the $5000 breaches an agent’s duty of loyalty to the principal 
although A’s interest that Grace win the race appears to be completely 
aligned with P’s interest as the racehorse’s owner. But A’s perspective is 
not identical to P’s. A’s interest in spurring Grace on to victory may shape 
how A interprets instructions received from P, who, although not wishing 
that Grace be hobbled in the particular race, may also wish that Grace not be 
extraordinarily taxed so that she may compete more effectively in other 
races in the near future.  
In more general terms, only the principal can assess how best to further 
the principal’s own interests and objectives. The prospect of acquiring a 
side benefit may distract the agent from focusing on accomplishing the 
principal’s objectives by biasing how the agent interprets instructions re-
ceived from the principal and understands what the principal wishes to 
achieve. This is so even when the side benefit received by the agent does 
not come at an explicit cost to the principal. If the agent, in contrast, duly 
discloses the prospect of the side payment, in determining whether to con-
sent, the principal may assess how the payment may compromise or aid the 
agent’s performance. 
  
 29. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.02 illus. 1 (2006). 
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III. CONSEQUENCES OF AN AGENT’S DISLOYALTY 
A. Remedies for Breach of an Agent’s Duty of Loyalty  
1. Remedies in General. 
It is helpful, for starters, to note how broad a principal’s remedies may 
be when an agent acts disloyally. These remedies reflect a rich mixture de-
rived from contract law, tort law, and restitution and unjust enrichment. An 
agent’s breach subjects the agent to liability to the principal for loss that the 
breach causes the principal.30 To establish such loss, it is not necessary for 
the principal to establish a “but-for” causal relationship between its loss and 
the agent’s misconduct, only that the misconduct was a substantial factor in 
an outcome adverse to the principal.31 The “substantial factor” standard for 
loss causation has been explicitly characterized as a “prophylactic rule in-
tended to remove all incentive to breach—not simply to compensate for 
damages in the event of a breach.”32  
A breach of fiduciary duty may also subject the agent to liability for pu-
nitive damages when the circumstances satisfy general standards for their 
imposition. Indeed, a breach of fiduciary duty has long been actionable as a 
tort within U.S. tort law.33 The availability of punitive damages is, of 
course, not consistent with contract law theories of damage. Moreover, the 
law of restitution and unjust enrichment also creates a basis for an agent’s 
liability to a principal. If, through the breach, the agent has realized a mate-
rial benefit, the agent has a duty to account to the principal for the benefit, 
its value, or its proceeds. An agent must also account to the principal for the 
agent’s use of the principal’s property when the use violates the agent’s 
duty to the principal, although the principal cannot establish loss stemming 
from the use. A principal may also be able to avoid a transaction with the 
agent or a third party that stems from the agent’s breach of duty. 
2. The Character and Functions of Duties of Loyalty 
These consequences, ones that conventionally and uncontroversially 
follow an agent’s breach of a duty of loyalty, provide some insight into the 
character and functions of the underlying duties themselves. The remedies 
available to a principal do not map neatly onto the contours of either con-
tract law or tort law principles and remedies. For example, remedies that 
  
 30. Id. § 8.01 cmt. d(1). 
 31. See ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988, 996 (2d Cir. 1983). 
 32. See Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy v. Boon, 13 F.3d 537, 543 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting 
ABKCO Music, 722 F.2d at 995-96) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 (1979) (“One standing in a fiduciary relation with 
another is subject to liability to the other for harm resulting from a breach of duty imposed by the rela-
tion.”). On the rationale for and consequences of treating breach of fiduciary duty as a tort, see DeMott, 
supra note 3, at 927-34. 
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have the consequence of stripping profit or benefit from the agent do not 
necessarily approximate the amount of harm that a principal either has suf-
fered or would be able to prove or the benefit that the principal expected to 
realize through the transaction conducted by the agent. 
As a consequence, fiduciary doctrine as a whole is often characterized 
as prophylactic, geared to discourage breach by persons subject to fiduciary 
duties. Thus, a breach of a duty of loyalty triggers remedies and other con-
sequences, distinct from whether the person protected by the duty can estab-
lish that the breach in fact led to injury or in fact stemmed from disloyal 
motives on the part of the fiduciary.34 It’s no defense to a fiduciary who 
self-deals or otherwise breaches a duty of loyalty that the beneficiary of the 
duty in some sense benefited through the fiduciary’s conduct.35 Fiduciary 
doctrine’s stringency reflects pragmatic concerns. These include the diffi-
culties inherent in judicial second-guessing of decisions that are often dis-
cretionary, as well as the ease with which a disloyal fiduciary may often 
conceal misconduct.36 Fiduciary doctrine’s stringency may also respond to 
the risk that a fiduciary, aware of an opportunity to self-deal in a manner 
that may or may not risk injury to the principal, might be tempted to take 
the opportunity by the prospect that no provable harm to the principal will 
follow.  
An agent’s duties of loyalty are also tied in many ways to duties of per-
formance that the agent owes the principal, as the initial examples discussed 
above illustrate. The “real estate man” who represented the seller of the 
house purchased by Professor Seavey owed his principal, the seller, a duty 
to disclose the purchaser’s willingness to pay more than her reservation 
price for the house. The duty of loyalty that the agent owed the seller as his 
principal—not to take an unconsented-to material benefit in connection with 
a transaction on her account—undergirds or supports the agent’s duties of 
performance. Likewise, the firm of solicitors in Hilton owed each of their 
clients duties of disclosure and of effective representation, and had the firm 
not breached its duties of loyalty to both clients, it is much more likely that 
the firm would not also have failed to fulfill its duties of performance. Even 
the jockey who rode Grace in the race, dazzled by the prospect of a large 
payment promised by a third party, may disregard or misinterpret the in-
structions provided by Grace’s owner, the jockey’s principal. 
A possible generalization is that duties of loyalty play an exclusively 
subsidiary function, which is to assist in securing the performance of other 
duties. More specifically, duties of loyalty perform an insulation role that 
attaches adverse legal consequences to conduct by an agent or other fiduci-
  
 34. See Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic Character 
and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1054 (1991). 
 35. For this point in trust law, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78(2) (Tentative Draft No. 
4, 2005), stating, “Except in discrete circumstances, the trustee is subject to a strict prohibition against 
engaging in transactions that involve self-dealing or . . . create a conflict between the trustee’s fiduciary 
duties and personal interests.”  
 36. Id. cmt. b. 
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ary who undertakes a distracting interest or influence.37 Although this gen-
eralization helps explain much about the consequences that follow breaches 
of duties of loyalty, its explanatory force has limits. For example, it is not a 
defense to an agent who breaches a duty of loyalty that the agent can estab-
lish that other duties owed the principal were performed with good out-
comes for the principal. That is, if duties of loyalty have purely subsidiary 
functions, it’s odd that the common law consistently denies the agent an 
affirmative defense of establishing due performance of the agent’s duties of 
performance.38 
Moreover, agency law, at least in the United States, requires explicitly 
that an agent act “loyally for the principal’s benefit” in all matters con-
nected with the agency relationship.39 A principal may reasonably expect 
loyal service, not simply the due performance of the agent’s other duties. 
Moreover, as illustrated later in this Article, a principal’s expectation of 
loyal service, if disappointed by the agent, triggers rights in the principal 
that extend beyond protecting its expectation of due performance by the 
agent of its other duties.  
Finally, and more generally, at least some of the reasons why the law 
ascribes an independent significance to loyalty can be illustrated by a hypo-
thetical.40 Suppose you, as a principal, must choose between two agents—
Agent A or Agent B—to act as your investment manager. Suppose further 
that Agent A will “borrow” from your account and use the money for A’s 
own purposes without your consent but, before you are due an accounting, 
will replace the amount borrowed with interest. In contrast, Agent B will 
indulge in no “borrowing” at all. Wouldn’t you choose to be represented by 
Agent B? To be sure, we know with the benefit of hindsight that Agent A 
replaced the value “borrowed” from your account with interest. But Agent 
A’s removal of your assets for A’s own interim use created a risk to which 
you did not consent, which is that A would be unable to replace the value 
(let alone with interest) at the relevant later time. And Agent A’s “borrow-
ing” and use of your assets disregarded your ownership of them. Although 
your account, if managed by Agent B, will have the same end balance, you 
will not have borne the interim risk of possible consequences created by 
Agent A’s disloyalty. But now suppose further that Agent A will addition-
ally pay a premium into your account to compensate you for the additional 
risk you’ve borne. Agent A has still imposed that risk on you without your 
prior consent, and you might well wonder how (and by whom) an adequate 
  
 37. As Matthew Conaglen characterizes this function, fiduciary duties of loyalty seek “to insulate 
fiduciaries against situations where they might be swayed away from providing such proper perform-
ance.” Conaglen, supra note 28, at 473-74. 
 38. It has been argued that trust law should embrace such an affirmative defense, which it presently 
does not. See John H. Langbein, Questioning the Trust Law Duty of Loyalty: Sole Interest or Best Inter-
est?, 114 YALE L.J. 929, 988 (2005). 
 39. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (2006). 
 40. Many thanks to Richard E.V. Harris for this example. 
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risk premium might be computed. Life with Agent B seems less fraught 
with complications, some of which will be unanticipated. 
3. Forfeiture of Compensation. 
Consider against this background a recent case involving an especially 
ferocious additional remedy that may be available to a principal—forfeiture 
of compensation otherwise paid or payable to the agent. In Phansalkar v. 
Andersen Weinroth & Co., the plaintiff was a banker employed as an advi-
sor and deal facilitator by the defendant, an investment bank.41 The bank 
compensated the banker by paying him a fixed annual salary plus an amount 
determined by the bank on the basis of its annual profitability.42 Without the 
knowledge or consent of his superiors at the bank (or of anyone else there, 
for that matter) during his last year and a half at the bank, the banker ac-
cepted for his own account personal investment opportunities—including 
stock options—from three clients with whom he worked on transactions on 
the bank’s account.43 So, to accept material benefits on the side breached the 
banker’s duty of loyalty to his employer, the bank.44 Interestingly, though, 
the banker also worked on a fourth transaction in which he acted loyally, 
accepting no side benefit from the client.45  
The court held that the banker was subject to liability to the bank for the 
profits that he made, or the property that he obtained, through his receipt of 
material benefits from clients.46 More controversially, the court also held 
that all of the banker’s compensation for the year and a half—the period of 
disloyalty—could be forfeited to the bank.47 Although the banker acted loy-
ally in connection with one transaction out of four during this interval, the 
bank did not compensate him on a transaction-by-transaction basis.48  
A question raised by Phansalkar is whether a disloyal agent should be 
entitled to receive or retain compensation to the extent that the agent’s work 
generated net benefits for the principal. The banker in Phansalkar argued 
that, overall, the transactions for which he had responsibility were profitable 
for the bank, which received fees from its clients plus equity interests in 
their businesses.49 The rule applied by the court, which denies a disloyal 
agent a defense based on showing that the principal overall suffered no 
damage from the disloyal conduct, has the consequence of enabling the 
principal to retain the benefit of the agent’s work without paying compensa-
tion for it!50 Other cases condition the principal’s right to forfeiture on 
  
 41. 344 F.3d 184, 187 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 42. Id. at 190. 
 43. Id. at 190-91. 
 44. Id. at 203. 
 45. See id. at 193. 
 46. Id. at 211. 
 47. Id. at 199-200. 
 48. See id. at 191. 
 49. See id. at 201. 
 50. See id. at 208. 
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showing net injury stemming from the agent’s disloyalty or permit a dis-
loyal agent to limit forfeiture by establishing that the value of work per-
formed exceeded the damage done.51 
Which approach is preferable? Requiring that a principal establish dam-
age is inconsistent with a basic premise of remedies available for breach of 
fiduciary duty, which is that a principal need not establish harm resulting 
from an agent’s breach to require the agent to account. That is, the agent’s 
duty in Phansalkar to account to the bank for the material benefits the agent 
secretly received from clients—stock options, yachts, whatever—does not 
turn on whether the principal can establish that the agent’s receipt of such 
benefits injured its business, or even its reputation. But forfeiture of com-
pensation is not identical to accounting for a benefit received. Forfeiture is a 
separately available remedy, one that seems more geared to deterrence and 
to assuring that some remedy will be available against a disloyal agent even 
when the agent has realized no material benefit for which the agent must 
account. Moreover, requiring that the principal establish damage may tempt 
an agent to engage in conduct that breaches the agent’s fiduciary duties in 
the hope that no harm will befall the principal or that, if it does, the princi-
pal will be unable to establish it or unwilling to expend the resources re-
quired to litigate the question. 
Likewise, it is inconsistent with these basic points to permit an agent an 
offset for benefits that the agent’s work during the period of disloyalty gen-
erated for the principal. For one thing, the benefits generated by a disloyal 
agent may be difficult to quantify, especially when incentives created by the 
agent’s disloyalty reshape how the agent performs assigned work. For ex-
ample, an agent attracted by side benefits furnished by third parties with 
whom the agent deals on the principal’s behalf may be tempted to reallocate 
effort toward those clients, ignoring others who do not furnish comparable 
enticements. This prospect undercuts a fundamental element in an agency 
relationship, which is the principal’s ability to control the agent and focus 
the agent’s attention on doing the work assigned by the principal. A princi-
pal may seek to effect its control in many ways, among them the compensa-
tion and other incentive structures applicable to the agent, as well as instruc-
tions furnished the agent. Side enticements undermine the efficacy of these 
measures. 
These arguments are not inconsistent with retaining some degree of ju-
dicial discretion in assessing an appropriate amount of forfeiture. For exam-
ple, in Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, Ltd. v. Malhotra, a bank employee who 
pleaded guilty to criminal fraud charges was not required by the court to 
disgorge to the bank all the half-million dollars paid by the bank as compen-
  
 51. See, e.g., Chem-Trend, Inc. v. Newport Indus., Inc., 279 F.3d 625, 630 (8th Cir. 2002) (applying 
Michigan law); Walsh v. Atl. Research Assocs., 71 N.E.2d 580, 585 (Mass. 1947); Burg v. Miniature 
Precision Components, Inc., 330 N.W.2d 192, 195 (Wis. 1983) (burden on employee resisting forfeiture 
to show value of services exceeded damage done by disloyalty). 
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sation and fringe benefits during his nine years of employment.52 Instead, 
the court limited forfeiture to $22,360 that the employee received as bo-
nuses over the nine years, noting that the employee also was subject to a 
restitution order in the amount of his fraudulent depredations from the 
bank.53 Applying Illinois law, the court characterized forfeiture as a form of 
“punitive damages” within a court’s equitable discretion, not a nondiscre-
tionary remedy.54  
More fundamentally, the approach to remedies for disloyal conduct by 
an agent that Phansalkar—and many other cases—represents is inconsistent 
with attempting to capture fiduciary duties of loyalty within contract law. 
Phansalkar represents an entitlement on the part of the principal to loyal 
service from an agent that operates independently of contract law norms. 
Enforcing this entitlement also reinforces other basic elements of an agency 
relationship, including the principal’s ability to control the agent’s conduct.  
Indeed, the gentler alternative rule limiting forfeiture when a disloyal 
agent’s work generates net benefit for the principal doesn’t correspond with 
contractual measures of damages.55 It is unknowable what measure of dam-
ages would place the principal in as good a position as loyal service by the 
agent would have done. Likewise, the reduced forfeiture measure doesn’t 
correspond to a measure of loss caused the principal by reliance on the 
agent nor does it represent a measure of benefit that the principal has con-
ferred on the agent. Instead, the reduced forfeiture measure seems more like 
a tort law measure of damages, one geared toward compensating the princi-
pal for harm done while acknowledging that such harm cannot be precisely 
quantified.56  
B. An Agent’s Duty to Disclose a Prior Breach of Duty 
An agent’s breach of duty—here, not necessarily confined to a breach 
of the agent’s duties of loyalty—triggers a further distinctive consequence, 
which is the agent’s duty to disclose the breach and other relevant informa-
tion to the principal. Recent cases are instructive on the content and implica-
tions of this duty, which is not mandated by general contract law.  
First, suppose the agent’s breach of duty concerns only what I have 
classified as a duty of performance. In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
Smith, Inc. v. Cheng, a stockbroker ignored a customer’s instructions and 
overbought the customer’s account.57 After overbuying the account, the 
broker told the customer about the misadventure and that the securities pur-
  
 52. 131 F. Supp. 2d 959, 961-62 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (applying Illinois law). 
 53. Id. at 962. 
 54. Id. at 961. 
 55. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344 (1981) (summarizing purposes of the law of 
contract remedies). 
 56. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 (1979) (stating general principles of measures of 
damages in tort). 
 57. 901 F.2d 1124, 1126-27 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
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chased—stock options—had since declined in market value, which had the 
effect of creating a debit in the customer’s account with the firm because it 
was a margin account.58 The broker also told the customer that his firm was 
still keen on the investment, believing that it would do well, and that there 
were two things the customer could do: either (1) sell the options; or (2) 
keep the options and send in more money to cover the debit in the cus-
tomer’s account.59 Not enough, responded the court—the broker’s duty to 
the client obliged the broker to disclose all material information, including 
information about courses of action open to the customer.60 In particular, the 
broker neglected to tell the customer that the customer had the right to reject 
the unauthorized option purchases.61  
Thus, although it may not be in an agent’s self-interest to do so, an 
agent’s duty to the principal requires disclosure of an unauthorized transac-
tion and of the principal’s right (when present) to avoid it. To be sure, the 
principal’s rights against the agent are not unbounded. Although the princi-
pal has a right to be indemnified by the agent against losses stemming from 
the agent’s unauthorized transaction, the principal’s indemnity claim does 
not extend to loss the principal could have avoided.62  
An agent’s duty of disclosure complements the principal’s basic right to 
determine, as between agent and principal, what actions the agent will have 
authority to take on the principal’s behalf. Common law agency does not 
require a principal, like the customer in Cheng, to detect unauthorized ac-
tion taken by the agent and to risk losing rights against the agent if an unau-
thorized transaction eludes monitoring by the principal. Agency relation-
ships involve delegation by the principal to the agent; what the agent in fact 
does may often be undetectable by the principal for some period of time. 
Indeed, agency relationships would become cumbersome if a principal’s 
right to authorize what the agent may rightfully do on the principal’s ac-
count came coupled with a requirement that the principal itself monitor the 
agent’s conduct, lest the principal lose its rights against an agent stemming 
from unauthorized action by the agent.  
An agent’s duty to disclose prior breaches of duty also encompasses the 
agent’s duties of loyalty, although fewer cases illustrate the point. A recent 
example comes from the English Court of Appeal, Item Software (UK) Ltd. 
v. Fassihi.63 Mr. Fassihi was the sales and marketing director of a company 
that distributed software products. His employment contract ran for an in-
definite period and was terminable on three months notice. Mr. Fassihi 
  
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 1128. 
 61. Id. 
 62. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.09 cmt. b (2006). In Cheng, the broker’s failure to 
disclose that the customer had the right to reject unauthorized transactions meant that the customer’s 
ability to mitigate loss was limited to the two alternative routes suggested by the broker, which had the 
consequence of enhancing the losses recoverable by the customer. 
 63. [2004] EWCA (Civ) 1244 (U.K.), available at 2004 WL 2077421. 
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wished to establish his own company. While still employed, he approached 
his employer’s chief supplier with his own proposal, while encouraging his 
employer’s managing director to press the supplier for more favorable 
terms. Upon discovery, Mr. Fassihi was summarily dismissed. Attempting 
to lure away the supplier to his own company-in-development breached Mr. 
Fassihi’s duty of loyalty to his principal. 
Separately, though, did Mr. Fassihi breach his fiduciary duty by failing 
to disclose his breach to his principal? If so, his breach presumably relieved 
the principal of its duty to provide three months notice prior to termination, 
a point to which I return later. The Court of Appeal held that Mr. Fassihi’s 
failure to disclose his breach constituted a separate breach of his fiduciary 
duty of loyalty, noting that the absence of such a duty “would mean that the 
company has to expend resources in investigating his conduct and that the 
enforcement of a liability to compensate the company for misconduct de-
pends on the happenchance of the company finding out about the impropri-
ety.”64 This rationale turns explicitly on the concern that an agency relation-
ship not condition the effectiveness of an agent’s obligations on the effec-
tiveness with which the principal monitors the agent, the same rationale I 
have suggested for the outcome in Cheng. Instead, both Cheng and Fassihi 
facilitate a principal’s control over its agents by explicitly imposing duties 
of disclosure on agents concerning their own conduct. 
The question addressed by Fassihi also comes into play when an em-
ployee or other agent negotiates a severance contract with the principal—or 
a favorable modification to the original contract—while the principal re-
mains ignorant of the agent’s breach of duty. Should the principal be able to 
avoid the contract as a remedy for the agent’s breach of a duty to disclose 
the prior breach? On this question, U.S. authority appears to be more protec-
tive of the principal than are English cases. In Hadden v. Consolidated Edi-
son Co., a company’s officer negotiated a favorable severance package, 
having assured his superiors that there was no truth in rumors that he had 
been a participant in a kickback scheme.65 The court held that the officer’s 
denials, which were false, constituted fraudulent misstatements that entitled 
the company to avoid the severance deal struck with the executive.66 In dic-
tum, the court went further, stating that the officer’s failure to disclose his 
wrongdoing itself constituted a breach of fiduciary duty that would make 
the severance deal avoidable by the company.67  
  
 64. Id. ¶ 65. For agreement with the court’s analysis in Fassihi, see John Armour & Matthew Cona-
glen, Directorial Disclosure, [2005] C.L.J. 48, 51, stating, “A director’s duty of loyalty is subjective 
because the director, rather than the court, is normally better placed to determine where the company’s 
interests lie. The fact that directors will rarely be shown to have breached this duty is no basis for not 
applying it; such cases will, by definition, be the most egregious examples of misconduct and should 
carry liability.” 
 65. 382 N.E.2d 1136, 1138 (N.Y. 1978). 
 66. Id. at 1139. 
 67. Id. 
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In contrast, two English cases that preceded Fassihi are more restrictive. 
In Bell v. Lever Brothers Ltd., the House of Lords held that a parent corpo-
ration could not avoid severance contracts entered into with employees of a 
subsidiary although the employees did not disclose that they had breached 
their duties by profiting through secret deals on their own account.68 In par-
ticular, two of the Lords stated that an employee owed no “superadded duty 
to confess,”69 either when committing a wrongful act or when receiving 
payment from the employer. More recently, the Court of Appeal extended 
the logic of Bell to company directors who enter into agreements for in-
creased remuneration or for severance pay.70 One explanation may be that 
the English cases assume that negotiating a severance agreement or another 
variation to an existing employment contract should be a salient point for 
the employer or other principal, such that is it not unreasonable to expect 
that the principal would do as the principal did in Hadden and make an af-
firmative inquiry of the agent. In contrast, the dictum in Hadden may as-
sume that the ongoing fiduciary relationship between a principal and an 
agent entitles the principal to expect that the agent will be loyal, an expecta-
tion that runs counter to assuming that the principal will affirmatively inter-
rogate the agent prior to notice of disloyal conduct.  
C. The Impact of Breaches of Fiduciary Duty on Contractual Provisions 
A related question deserving at least brief mention is the impact that an 
agent’s disloyalty should have on rights and obligations previously articu-
lated in a contract between agent and principal, for example, on the three-
month notice requirement for termination specified in Mr. Fassihi’s con-
tract. At this point, a full account requires consideration of contract law 
principles. Under basic contract law, a material failure of performance on 
the part of one party constitutes the nonoccurrence of a constructive condi-
tion on the other party’s remaining duties of performance under the contract 
and justifies suspension of performance under the contract.71 Beyond sus-
pension of performance, termination of the contract may also be justified.72  
Clearly these basic rules apply to contracts between agents and princi-
pals. But suppose that a contract between an agent and a principal contains 
an explicit provision requiring that, prior to termination of the contract, the 
principal give the agent notice of and an opportunity to cure any breaches. 
Does a “notice and cure” provision require a principal to continue a rela-
  
 68. [1932] A.C. 161, 223 (U.K.). Bell is best known for its treatment of mistake in contract law. For 
a nuanced account of the underlying events and business history in Bell, see Catharine MacMillan, How 
Temptation Led to Mistake: An Explanation of Bell v. Lever Brothers, Ltd., 119 L.Q.R. 625 (2003). 
 69. Bell, [1932] A.C. at 228.  
 70. Horcal Ltd. v. Gatland, [1984] 1 B.C.C. 99089 (U.K.), available at 1984 WL 282917. 
 71. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 237 (1981).  
 72. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 8.18 (3d ed. 2004) (discussing 
circumstances under which termination is justified). 
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tionship with a disloyal agent—an agent whose breaches of duty go beyond 
defaults in performing duties of performance?  
Although notice and cure provisions create the theoretical prospect of a 
turf battle between contract law and fiduciary duty, in practice, courts re-
solve the impasse by determining that notice and cure provisions are inap-
plicable unless an agent’s breach is curable. Fiduciary norms thus appear to 
dominate as a consequence. For example, in Larken, Inc. v. Larken Iowa 
City Limited Partnership, the owner of a hotel entered into a management 
contract with a hotel manager containing a notice and cure requirement.73 
The court held that the provision did not restrict the owner’s right to termi-
nate the contract with the manager when the manager engaged in a series of 
self-dealing transactions “so serious that they frustrated one of the principal 
purposes of the management agreement, which was to manage the hotel in 
the best interests of the owner and to be honest and forthright in its deal-
ings.”74 Many breaches of the fiduciary duty of loyalty thus are likely to be 
incurable because they contravene the principal’s expectation of faithful 
service by the agent. To the extent the law attaches operational conse-
quences to this expectation, an agent’s duties of loyalty appear to have func-
tions beyond affording subsidiary assistance toward assuring due perform-
ance of an agent’s other duties.  
D. Disloyal Actors Within Organizational Agents 
Many agents are organizations that carry out their work on behalf of 
principals through employees and other agents of the organization itself. 
Among the agents discussed so far in this Article, Merrill Lynch in Cheng 
and the firm of solicitors in Hilton themselves undertook to act as agents on 
behalf of client-principals, including the plaintiff in each case. Necessarily 
the work of each organization was performed by individuals acting on its 
behalf. In both cases, as in many agency cases, it’s likely that breaches of 
duty on the part of individual actors, if intentional, were motivated by a 
concern to further the interests of the firm, however misguided the actor’s 
conduct may appear to be. That is, by failing to inform his customer that he 
had the right to reject an unauthorized purchase, the individual Merrill 
Lynch broker in Cheng may well have sought to protect the firm’s position. 
  
 73. 589 N.W.2d 700, 700 (Iowa 1998). 
 74. Id. at 704; accord Union Miniere, S.A. v. Parday Corp., 521 N.E.2d 700, 703 & n.4 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 1988) (agent engaged to manage mining business acted affirmatively to undermine principal’s 
business by attempting to dissuade state department from renewing principal’s mining permit—agent’s 
conduct “of a nature not easily curable”). A separate question is the weight to be placed on contractual 
silence about the consequences of an agent’s disloyalty. Union Miniere was distinguished by Mor-Cor 
Packaging Prods. v. Innovative Packaging Corp., 328 F. Supp. 2d 857, 864 (N.D. Ill. 2004) on the basis 
that under Wisconsin law, it is “not clear that a material breach necessarily relieves a party of its obliga-
tions to comply with a contract’s notice and cure provision prior to termination.” Although Mor-Cor 
noted that the contract made exceptions to the notice and cure provision for circumstances other than 
breach of fiduciary duty, it also found that “[m]ore importantly . . . the alleged breach in the instant case 
appears to have been curable.” Id. at 864. 
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In Hilton, the individual solicitors who failed to disclose adverse facts about 
one client to another may well have been motivated to further the firm’s 
interest in recovering the deposit money lent on the firm’s behalf to one 
client.   
More challenging questions arise when an individual actor’s breach of a 
duty of loyalty represents a frolic and detour of the individual’s own, neither 
motivated by nor consistent with the interests of the organization. In par-
ticular, is an organizational agent itself accountable for—and thus subject to 
the remedies and other consequences that stem from—an individual actor’s 
breach of a duty of loyalty? If the question is framed as an inquiry domi-
nated by tort law, then it may be determinative of the outcome whether the 
actor’s conduct falls within the scope of employment for purposes of the 
employer’s vicarious liability under the respondeat superior doctrine. In 
most jurisdictions, an employee who intentionally acts in a wrongful man-
ner and with no purpose of serving the employer’s interests is characterized 
as having acted outside the scope of employment,75 which would mean that 
an organizational agent would not itself be accountable for a significant 
class of fiduciary transgressions on the part of its own employees and other 
agents. 
Common law agency, however, frames the inquiry otherwise. An organ-
izational agent’s employees assigned to work on matters for principals 
whom the organization itself represents are classified as subagents. Com-
mon law agency defines a subagent as “a person appointed by an agent to 
perform functions that the agent has consented to perform on behalf of the 
agent’s principal.”76 A subagent acts subject to the control of the appointing 
agent and owes an agent’s duties—including duties of loyalty—to both the 
appointing agent and the principal. An appointing agent is responsible to the 
principal for the subagent’s conduct, subject to the terms of any agreement 
between the appointing agent and the principal.77 The appointing agent’s 
responsibility stems from its delegation to the subagent of functions and 
duties that, as an agent, it owes to the principal. 
Significant consequences follow from attributing individual actors’ 
breaches of the duty of loyalty to the organizational agent on whose behalf 
the individual actors work. Attribution creates incentives for an organiza-
tional agent to use care in selecting and monitoring the individual actors 
who carry out its work. Attribution also eliminates what would otherwise be 
gaps in the enforcement regime for duties of loyalty. These gaps stem from 
the relative positions of organizational agents and subagents as well as from 
the structure of remedies for breach of duties of loyalty. It is likely that an 
appointing agent will be more readily located than a misbehaving subagent 
and that the appointing agent’s assets will provide more ample resources 
from which to compensate a principal against losses. Additionally, any con-
  
 75. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07 (2006). 
 76. Id. § 3.15(1). 
 77. Id. cmt. d. 
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tractual relationship is likely to be between the principal and the organiza-
tional agent; attributing subagents’ breaches of duty of loyalty to their ap-
pointing organizational agent is essential to effective recognition of the im-
pact of the disloyal conduct on the principal’s rights and liabilities as de-
fined by the contract. Relatedly, if the principal has paid or agreed to pay a 
commission or other compensation for services to be rendered by an organ-
izational agent, it is the organization against whom forfeiture should operate 
because the right to receive or retain the compensation is the organization’s. 
Finally, an appointing agent’s accountability for disloyal conduct by its sub-
agents reduces the temptation, otherwise present to an unscrupulous agent, 
to structure its dealings with principals through a specially created vehicle 
to which the agent transfers assets and which appoints the agent its sub-
agent.78 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The common law of agency has not always attracted the degree of aca-
demic interest that’s warranted by its ubiquity, as well as its theoretical in-
terest and practical significance. The issues explored in this Article illustrate 
various dimensions of only a portion of agency’s intellectual richness and 
challenge—what consequences should follow an agent’s disloyalty and how 
best to justify those consequences. In assigning consequences to an agent’s 
disloyalty, it is important to be mindful of distinctive aspects of agency rela-
tionships and of an agent’s duties of loyalty. The functions served by these 
duties are related to, but distinct from, the duties of performance that an 
agent also owes to a principal. An agent’s duties of loyalty also operate with 
consequences not captured by contract law and tort law principles, conse-
quences that both define and reinforce a principal’s entitlement to faithful 
service from its agents. 
  
 78. For further elaboration on remedial consequences for an appointing agent when a subagent’s 
conduct is disloyal, see DeMott, supra note 3, at 956. 
